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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This case involves a dispute over retiree healthcare 
benefits. Retired union member Ronald Cup and similarly 
situated retirees requested—and the District Court ordered—
arbitration of the dispute under the Labor Management 
Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185. Ampco Pittsburgh 
Corporation, its subsidiary Akers National Roll Company, and 
Akers’ health and welfare benefit plan (collectively, the 
Company) filed this appeal, arguing that the District Court 
erred when it ordered arbitration. The appeal raises important 
questions of appellate jurisdiction and contract interpretation. 
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I 
A 
 Akers operated a manufacturing facility in Avonmore, 
Pennsylvania. The Avonmore plant’s employees were union 
members represented by the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, 
Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service 
Workers International Union, AFL-CIO/CLC, formerly known 
as the United Steelworkers of America (USW). For many years 
Akers and the USW engaged in a negotiation process that 
culminated in a series of collective bargaining agreements, as 
well as memoranda of agreement addressing the details of 
various employment policies. 
 In 2016, Akers was acquired by Ampco and a dispute 
over healthcare benefits soon arose. At that time, former 
Avonmore plant employees who had retired but were still 
under the age of 65 (i.e., not yet eligible for Medicare) paid 
$195 per month for their healthcare. But in July 2016, Ampco 
announced its intention to eliminate this healthcare plan for 
former Avonmore plant employees who had retired before 
March 1, 2015. The new plan would require retirees to 
purchase health insurance on the private market and then be 
reimbursed up to $500 per month for individuals or $700 per 
month for families. The affected retirees opposed this change 
because “the monetary value of the monthly 
reimbursement . . . is limited,” “the reimbursement is only 
available for five years,” and the retirees would have to “shop 
to purchase plans on the private market.” App. 28. They also 
concluded that it violated a memorandum of agreement (MOA) 
dated February 26, 2015, which provided that while “[a]ll 
active employees [would] be transferred to the [Company’s] 
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new health plan. . . . [c]urrent retirees will remain on their 
existing Plan ($195.00 monthly premium).” App. 95. 
B 
Shortly thereafter, the USW sought recourse under the 
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in effect at the time. It 
filed a grievance under Section 6 of the CBA, which applies 
when “differences arise between the Company and the Union 
or its members as to interpretation or application of, or 
compliance with the [CBA’s] provisions.” App. 207–08. 
Ampco rejected the grievance on the ground that the Union no 
longer represented the retirees. 
The USW and Ronald Cup, who retired from the 
Avonmore plant in 2014, sued the Company on behalf of Cup 
and other similarly-situated workers who retired before March 
1, 2015. As amended, their complaint contains three counts: 
(I) a non-substantive claim compelling arbitration under § 301 
of the LMRA, (II) a claim to enforce the CBA under § 301, and 
(III) in the alternative, a claim under § 502(a) of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a). The USW and Cup (collectively referred to as the 
Union) brought Counts II and III “solely in the event that the 
Court determines that the Company is not obligated to arbitrate 
the retiree health dispute.” App. 326. 
 The Company moved under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The 
Union responded by moving to compel arbitration, arguing that 
Section 6, which permits the Union to “appeal[] . . . to 
arbitration” an “unsatisfactory” Company grievance 
determination, App. 208, applied to the parties’ dispute over 
the retiree-healthcare provision of the MOA as well as to the 
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CBA itself. The District Court agreed and granted the motion 
to compel in an order entered on June 13, 2017. Emphasizing 
the “strong federal policy in favor of resolving labor disputes 
through arbitration,” it found that the CBA’s “broad arbitration 
provision . . . does not expressly narrow or limit the types of 
disputes that the Parties intend to resolve through . . . 
arbitration.” Cup v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 2017 WL 
2559624, at *1–2 (W.D. Pa. June 13, 2017) (quoting Rite Aid 
of Pa., Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 
Local 1776, 595 F.3d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2010)). Because the 
language of Section 6 was capacious enough to encompass the 
parties’ dispute, the dispute was presumptively arbitrable. 
Having ruled in the Union’s favor on the arbitration 
count, the District Court did three other things in its June 13 
order. First, it dismissed the two substantive counts without 
ruling on their merits. Second, with the dispute apparently 
headed for arbitration, it denied the Company’s motion to 
dismiss as moot and announced its intention to order the parties 
to mediation before the more formal arbitration, as stipulated. 
Finally, the Court administratively closed the case. The 
Company timely appealed. 
Meanwhile, the District Court took a number of 
administrative actions related to the June 13 order. In another 
order filed the next day, it referred the parties to mediation, 
which was unsuccessful. The District Court later denied the 
Company’s motion to stay discovery while this appeal was 
pending, but this Court stayed enforcement of the arbitration 
order pending the outcome of this appeal. 
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II 
 The Company appeals the District Court’s order 
granting the Union’s motion to compel arbitration, asserting 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3).1 As always, we must 
determine whether we have jurisdiction to hear the Company’s 
appeal, and our jurisdiction is not obvious in this case. 
 We have jurisdiction over “final decisions of the district 
courts.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291–92. Similarly, the Federal 
Arbitration Act provides for appeals of “final decision[s] with 
respect to an arbitration.” 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3). Because finality 
is the key to jurisdiction under both of these statutes, we must 
determine whether the District Court’s order compelling 
arbitration and administratively closing this case is final. 
 The Union claims the District Court’s administrative 
closure does not mean that its order compelling arbitration was 
final and appealable. The Union is quite right on this point, as 
we made clear in Penn West Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 371 
F.3d 118, 127–28 (3d Cir. 2004). But the order under review 
here did more than close the case administratively; the District 
Court also ordered arbitration and dismissed all of the other 
claims without prejudice. These additional components 
implicate our decision in Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, 
LLC, 709 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2013), where we held that an 
administrative closure was not an appealable final judgment 
where the district court had ordered arbitration while the 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction over this dispute 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
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plaintiff’s employment discrimination claim was still pending. 
Id. at 247. 
Unlike in Freeman, where the plaintiff’s substantive 
claim remained pending despite the arbitration order, the 
District Court here granted the relief the Union sought in 
Count I (compelled arbitration) and dismissed its substantive 
claims in Counts II and III, “end[ing] the litigation on the 
merits and leav[ing] nothing more for the court to do but 
execute the judgment.” See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. 
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86 (2000) (citations omitted). The 
District Court thus “disposed of the entire case . . . and left no 
part of it pending.” See id. This is true even though the 
dismissal was without prejudice. Because there was “‘nothing 
more for the court to do but execute the judgment,’ the District 
Court’s order falls within the Supreme Court’s definition of an 
appealable final order.” Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 
F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 
86) (order dismissing case without prejudice where all claims 
were arbitrable was final and immediately appealable). 
Our conclusion that the District Court’s order is final 
and appealable was presaged by our decision in Penn West, 
where we made clear that an administrative-closure order “was 
not a final, appealable order absent a separate document to 
signal the court’s ‘view that the case had concluded.’” 371 F.3d 
at 127–28 (quoting Lehman v. Revolution Portfolio LLC, 166 
F.3d 389, 392 (1st Cir. 1999)). In this case, the District Court’s 
dismissal of both substantive counts is about as strong a 
“signal” as we can envision, and its order sending the parties 
to mediation does not call it into question. The parties had 
stipulated to the mediation earlier in the litigation, and their 
participation in it—no matter what the outcome—still “le[ft] 
nothing more for the [District C]ourt to do.” See Green Tree, 
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531 U.S. at 86. As far as the District Court was concerned, the 
case was over. 
 For the reasons stated, we hold that the order compelling 
arbitration is final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the 
Federal Arbitration Act. 
III 
Having determined that we have jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal, we turn to the arbitration order itself. The parties agree 
that their dispute is arbitrable if it is properly characterized as 
a “difference[] . . . between the Company and the Union or its 
members as to interpretation or application of, or compliance 
with the provisions of [the CBA].” See App. 207–08 (CBA 
Section 6). But the Company argues that this dispute is not 
subject to arbitration under Section 6, because retiree health 
benefits are not covered by the CBA. We agree. 
A 
 Because CBAs must be interpreted “according to 
ordinary principles of contract law,” M&G Polymers USA, 
LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 933 (2015), we ascertain 
whether the CBA provides for retiree health benefits by 
studying its language. According to the Union, the key 
provision is found in Section 19, “Other Plans,” which 
provides that the employees subject to the CBA are covered by 
various benefit “Plans,” which include “Medical Insurance.” 
App. 236. 
The Union mischaracterizes Section 19 as 
“identif[ying] Company benefits plans enjoyed by both 
employees and retirees.” Union Br. 15 (emphasis added). 
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Contrary to the quoted statement, the CBA states that it applies 
only to “employees”—a term defined elsewhere to include 
“production and maintenance employees at the Company’s 
Avonmore plant as of the date of this Agreement and 
thereafter.” App. 205 (emphasis added). So former employees 
like Cup, who retired before the CBA went into effect on 
March 1, 2015, are not “employees” under the CBA. 
B 
 The Union’s fallback position is that even if retirees are 
not among the “employees” to whom Section 19 expressly 
applies, Section 19 implicitly incorporates the MOA, which 
does discuss retiree health benefits. In relevant part, the MOA 
provides that while “[a]ll active employees wi[ll] be 
transferred to [a] new health plan . . . [c]urrent retirees will 
remain on their existing Plan ($195.00 monthly premium).” 
App. 95. The Union contends that this section is implicitly tied 
to Section 19, which refers to “Medical Insurance.” See 
App. 236. Persuaded by this argument, the District Court 
concluded that the dispute was within the ambit of the CBA 
(and, by extension, Section 6’s arbitration procedure) because 
the CBA “expressly includes ‘Medical Insurance’ as an 
included ‘Other Plan.’” Cup, 2017 WL 2559624, at *2 (quoting 
CBA Sections 6 and 19). We cannot agree that the words 
“Medical Insurance” supply the missing link between the 
MOA and the CBA. 
 Even assuming Section 19’s reference to “Medical 
Insurance” includes retiree health benefits as well as the “new 
health plan” for current employees, see App. 95, this single 
mention is insufficient to incorporate the MOA on the subject 
of retiree healthcare into the CBA. Our conclusion is consistent 
with United Steelworkers of America v. Rohm & Haas Co., 522 
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F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 2008), which involved a challenge by a group 
of manufacturing workers and their union to a denial of 
disability benefits. Id. at 327, 334. The union in that case 
argued that a collective bargaining provision similar to 
Section 6 here mandated arbitration because “disability 
benefits are generally provided for under the . . . CBA,” which 
contained one reference to a “Sickness and Accident plan.” Id. 
at 334. We rejected this argument, as “the mere reference to 
the ‘Sickness and Accident plan’ without more d[id] not 
incorporate the entire Plan into the . . . CBA.” Id. (citing RCA 
Corp. v. Local 241, Int’l Fed’n of Prof’l and Tech. Eng’rs, 700 
F.2d 921, 927 (3d Cir. 1983)). Under those circumstances, the 
CBA was not so ambiguous as to be “reasonably interpreted to 
provide for disability benefits or to provide for arbitrating a 
plan administrator’s denial of such benefits arising from a 
separate ERISA plan.” Id.; cf. Rosenblum v. Travelbyus.com 
Ltd., 299 F.3d 657, 665–66 (7th Cir. 2002) (no incorporation 
where one agreement “identifie[d]” another but “d[id] not 
incorporate its terms”). So too here. 
 The Union tries to distinguish Rohm & Haas on the 
ground that the disability plan in that case, unlike the 
healthcare plan at issue here, “contained its own dispute-
resolution procedures.” Union Br. 53. This, it contends, is 
“potent evidence” that the parties in Rohm & Haas “did not 
intend that disagreements arising under that plan be resolved 
by the CBA’s arbitration procedure.” Id. This argument is 
logical, but the existence of the healthcare plan’s dispute-
resolution procedures was not part of our analysis in Rohm & 
Haas. 
Perhaps for that reason, the Union bases its argument 
not on Rohm & Haas but on our decision in RCA Corp. v. Local 
241, International Federation of Professional and Technical 
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Engineers. Like the retiree health plan under discussion here, 
the retirement plan at issue in RCA “fail[ed] to provide an 
independent basis for mandatory arbitration.” 700 F.2d at 927. 
But that does not help the Union’s cause, because we declined 
to require arbitration of the dispute in RCA. Id. There, the CBA 
“expressly provide[d] for arbitration and mention[ed] the 
Retirement Plan” but contained “no provision . . . that either 
brings or seeks to bring the Retirement Plan within the ambit 
of the General Agreement.” Id. For this reason, we concluded 
that “mere[ly] mentioning . . . the Retirement Plan in the 
General Agreement [wa]s insufficient reason to construe the 
Retirement Plan as part and parcel of the General Agreement.” 
Id. 
 The same is true of the CBA and MOA in this case. 
Despite the Union’s arguments to the contrary, Section 19 of 
the CBA does not incorporate the MOA because “[m]ere 
reference to another contract or document is not sufficient to 
incorporate its terms into a contract. There must be an express 
intent to incorporate, and there is no such expression here.” 
Rosenblum, 299 F.3d at 666. 
 If anything, the CBA suggests an intent not to 
incorporate the MOA, as language expressly incorporating 
other agreements can be found elsewhere in the CBA. 
Section 9-E(6), for example, declares that “[t]he Absentee 
Control Program and the Tardy/Short Shift Programs . . . are 
incorporated in this contract as a [sic] separate memoranda.” 
App. 214. This section makes clear that the parties to the CBA 
knew how to incorporate other agreements into the CBA, so 
it’s telling that they chose not to use the same language in 
Section 19. 
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 With the benefit of hindsight, the Union now tries to 
reverse-engineer the requisite intent to incorporate, arguing 
that “[o]ver the years, the parties [have] repeatedly used the 
CBA grievance and arbitration procedures to resolve their 
disputes about benefits identified in the CBA’s ‘Other Plans’ 
section, including disputes regarding retiree benefits.” Union 
Br. 9. But “extrinsic evidence of ‘past practice’ [may] be 
admitted, if at all, only to resolve an ambiguity in the CBA,” 
Quick v. NLRB, 245 F.3d 231, 247–48 (3d Cir. 2001), and 
“should not be used to add terms to a contract that is plausibly 
complete without them,” U.A.W. Local 1697 v. Skinner Engine 
Co., 188 F.3d 130, 146 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Bidlack v. 
Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 1993) (en 
banc)). We agree with the Company that the CBA does not 
present us with “either contractual language on which to hang 
the label of ambiguous or some yawning void . . . that cries out 
for an implied term.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 
Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 608). The parties chose not to include 
language incorporating the MOA, so we cannot incorporate it 
for them. 
 Our conclusion that the CBA does not incorporate the 
MOA has an additional consequence: the Union cannot invoke 
the presumption of arbitrability to salvage its position. Where 
the presumption applies, a court may not deny a motion to 
compel arbitration “unless it may be said with positive 
assurance that the [contract’s] arbitration clause is not 
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted 
dispute.” AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 
U.S. 643, 650 (1986); see also Local 827, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. 
Workers v. Verizon N.J., Inc., 458 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(presumption applies where arbitration clause “is clearly broad 
or ambiguous”). But this presupposes that the contract in 
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question contains an arbitration clause in the first place. See 
AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 650. Here, the CBA indisputably has 
an arbitration clause in Section 6, but the MOA—the contract 
under which this dispute actually arises—does not. And where 
there is no arbitration clause, the presumption does not apply. 
See id. 
 Because the parties’ dispute over retiree medical 
benefits is not subject to Section 6 of the CBA, it is not 
arbitrable. As the Company correctly points out, “there is no 
provision in the CBA regarding retiree medical benefits,” and 
the MOA does not provide for arbitration. Company Br. 10. 
Nor did the CBA include retirees in its definition of 
“employees” or incorporate the MOA’s provisions regarding 
retiree health benefits. The District Court therefore erred when 
it granted the Union’s motion to compel arbitration. The Union 
may, of course, pursue its substantive claims in Counts II and 
III on remand. 
* * * 
 The collective bargaining agreement at issue in this 
appeal does not address retirees, whose health benefits are 
discussed in a memorandum of agreement that was never 
incorporated into the CBA. We cannot know whether this 
result was intentional or inadvertent, but we must enforce the 
contracts as written. Accordingly, we will reverse and remand. 
